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ABSTRACT 
Preston’s (2011) challenge to the moral presumption against geoengineering is applied to 
carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) in Scotland, United Kingdom. Qualitative data is 
analysed to assess if and how Preston’s arguments play out in practice. We argue that the 
concepts of ‘lesser evil’ and prioritising human well-being over non-interference in natural 
processes do bring different value positions together in support of CCS, but that not all 
people see short-term carbon abatement as the ‘least worst’ option or a suitable way to 
prioritise human well-being. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) is a ‘clean coal’ energy technology that traps 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuel-burning power stations and industrial 
sources, transports the CO2 by ship or pipeline and injects it into underground geological 
formations. The rationale for this is that CO2 is the main driver of anthropogenic climate 
change, a potentially serious threat to humans, animals and ecosystems. Support for CCS 
has come from both industry and government. Some academic projects and funders too 
have a stated aim to move CCS towards deployment (CASSEM Project, 2011; European 
Commission, 2009). 
CCS is often described as a vital – in cases like metals production the only – option to reduce 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel sources (DECC, 2014; Shell, 2014). The high proportion of 
electricity sourced from fossil fuels is cited to justify the necessity of CCS if deep cuts in 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions are to be achieved relatively soon (IEAGHG, 2014) whilst 
avoiding disruption from intermittent renewable energy supply and energy insecurity 
(GCCSI, 2014). Within this, there can be different grounds for supporting CCS, such as 
‘dynamics as usual’ – preserving existing processes of energy production and consumption 
as far as possible via technology that captures the end emissions. Another might be a 
perceived need for deep and urgent reductions in CO2 emissions, which must be applied to 
current fossil fuel sources to avoid an ‘overshoot’ scenario. CCS could even be seen as a 
more general effort to reduce human pollution of natural environments. We argue that 
whilst some publics and stakeholders with different standpoints can coalesce around CCS as 
necessary in the immediate future to respond to energy and climate challenges, others 
question if a focus on short- to medium-term (5–25 years) carbon abatement neglects 
deeper reflection on how society makes decisions about the environment and energy. 
 
2. CCS AS ETHICALLY OBJECTIONABLE, OR A LESSER EVIL? 
CCS is usually grouped among ‘low carbon’ energy technologies, perhaps because it is 
viewed as an ‘end of pipe’ pollution control added to a means of producing electricity (or to 
industrial operations such as cement, chemical and metal production). Nonetheless, it is 
3 
 
helpful to look to the emerging literature on geoengineering to more fully understand the 
ethical landscape of CCS, as CCS shares commonalities with geoengineering. Direct air 
capture requires a CO2 transport and storage infrastructure of the kind being developed 
through CCS (Brandani, 2012), hence at least some geoengineering options are likely to 
depend on prior CCS research and development. Taking the Royal Society definition of 
geoengineering as ‘deliberate large-scale manipulation of the planetary environment to 
counteract anthropogenic climate change’ (Shepherd et al, 2009: 1), CCS too is deliberate, 
large-scale, alters the planetary environment (subsurface geology) through injection of 
‘captured’ CO2 and is undertaken predominately as climate change mitigation. 
Indeed, some ethical issues already explored for geoengineering are pertinent to the 
capture, transport and storage of CO2. Hale and Grundy (2009) express concern at the 
implications for individuals’ sense of responsibility and respect if previous environmental 
‘wrongs’ can be corrected by technologies spatially and relationally removed from the 
polluter, and the lack of human agency in large-scale electricity generation suggests this 
concern may well be applicable to CCS – particularly if consumption of extracted fossil fuels 
is perpetuated without reflection from the end users. Similarly, Borgmann (2012) applies 
Weinberg’s (1967) concept of a ‘technological fix’ to geoengineering, in particular solar 
radiation management. Borgmann takes Weinberg’s concern about turning a complex social 
problem into an apparently simpler technological problem, and cautions that the setting 
within which people’s actions take place and the vision of the ‘good life’ that this setting 
supports should not go unchallenged. Borgmann’s apparent worry over geoengineering 
deflecting attention away from deeper questioning over the ‘good life’ resonates with the 
way a continuation of fossil fuel energy via CCS may mask bigger questions about what 
kinds of society we should be aiming for via climate change mitigation. 
The reliance of conventional CCS on coal and gas may also leave it open to contestations 
over the deleterious effects of fossil fuels. Markusson et al. (2012) warn CCS could lead to 
society being ‘locked in’ to ongoing fossil fuel use. This is not morally objectionable unless 
one believes that continued use of coal and gas is intrinsically bad; however Ha-Duong and 
Loisel (2011) suggest several hundred fatalities per year should be expected if CCS is 
deployed at large scale, mostly from (a) having to do more inherently dangerous coal 
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mining to fuel new CCS power stations and (b) transporting this coal by ship or train to the 
power stations. Environmental injustice claims have also been raised against some 
corporations involved in extractive industries (Boele et al., 2001). Intergenerational justice 
challenges too may arise from storing CO2 over thousands of years. The difficulty of gauging 
values and preferences of future generations, and in conceptualising the fairness of putting 
future generations at risk of exposure to negative effects from climate change, are well 
covered in climate change ethics (Gardiner, 2006; Jamieson, 2010). Similar questions may 
thus be asked about the fairness of leaving future generations with a large quantity of 
sequestered CO2 when uncertainty still exists over the level of maintenance (in terms of 
both costs and skills involved) this CO2 could need in the very long term (Evar, 2014). 
There are therefore several reasons why environmental ethicists might object to CCS 
deployment. However, if (a) deep and rapid cuts in anthropogenic CO2 emissions are 
required to avert dangerous climate change, yet (b) global fossil fuel usage for energy is 
unlikely to radically decrease in the near future (Scott et al., 2013), then ethical claims 
against CCS may become somewhat less clear-cut. Preston’s critical exploration of the 
presumptive argument against geoengineering in environmental ethics (2011) is thus a 
useful vehicle for evaluating the ethical challenges raised by CCS. Preston suggests two 
grounds on which the presumption in environmental ethics that geoengineering is 
inherently ‘bad’ may be open to scrutiny. One is the ‘lesser of two evils’ argument – that 
geoengineering could in certain contexts (such as severe warming posing a danger to 
humans and ecosystems) be seen as a serious attempt to make amends and lessen both 
human and non-human suffering. Preston’s second linked argument is prioritisation of 
human well-being, a view that if refusing geoengineering would involve knowingly letting 
people die in order not to interfere with the earth’s fundamental processes, then the 
obligations humans have to each other would likely trump values for natural processes. 
Strands of both Preston’s arguments appear in CCS debates. In the United Kingdom (UK), 
moderate environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the World Wide 
Fund for Nature and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds cautiously support CCS 
(Littlecott, 2012), acknowledging the continued short-term role of fossil fuels and viewing 
CCS as preferable to nuclear power. The position on CCS depends in part upon opposition to 
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nuclear – which in Britain is the only other reliable baseload low-carbon energy source 
available at present. In the UK context at least, the ‘lesser evil’ argument comes through 
here, for whilst many NGOs oppose fossil fuels in principle because of the adverse impacts 
on landscapes and communities, they accept carefully-managed carbon capture can provide 
a realistic non-nuclear trajectory away from fossil fuels.1 Similarly, debates continue over 
the effects on near-term consumer energy prices of a rapid introduction of renewable 
energy (Timilsina et al., 2013), which has potential to magnify issues of fuel poverty. Given 
the profound effects of rising energy costs on less economically advantaged sections of 
society (Ekins and Lockwood, 2011), managed use of fossil fuels with CCS could be seen as 
prioritising human well-being if it helps to mitigate fuel poverty. 
There is thus potential for a range of perspectives on whether CCS is ethically ‘good’ or 
‘bad’. Exploration of these competing viewpoints is a useful exercise in understanding how 
to negotiate the more ethically challenging dilemmas we may face as demanding low-
carbon targets are implemented or as energy security concerns intensify, yet it is only 
relatively recently that CCS-specific literature has explicitly addressed values and ethics. 
Brown (2011) and Medvecky et al. (2013) survey the ethical landscapes of geological CO2 
storage and CCS respectively. De Groot and Steg (2011) and McLaren (2012) explore 
potential for claims to injustice in CCS implementation. Gough and Boucher (2013) make 
one of the first attempts to map out the real-world ethical landscape of CCS, analysing 
statements on CO2 storage released by a range of developers, governmental bodies and 
NGOs to identify areas of potential ethical conflict. Gough and Boucher identify ethical 
‘faultlines’ (areas of potential or actual ethical contention) around environmental justice, 
preventing harm, techno-scientific competence and managerial and regulatory competence. 
We use these topics – justice, preventing harm and competence in CCS – as a point of 
departure. 
We do not seek to judge whether CCS is ‘ethical’ or ‘unethical’. Rather, building on the 
rigorous work of Gough and Boucher (2013) and discussions in the wider low-carbon and 
                                                 
1 We appreciate that in some other countries other alternatives – such as hydro-power in Norway 
– may be open to consideration; however the ‘clean fossil fuel’ or nuclear baseload dilemma seen 
in the UK is repeated in numerous other countries such as Germany, Poland and China. 
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geoengineering literatures, we seek to identify areas where ethical contestations or 
convergence around CCS may arise in an empirical case study. The aim is thus to explore 
the landscape of an ethically contentious decarbonisation debate, and to consider how 
members of society with different value positions may splinter or come together to support 
a particular course of practical action. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
This paper uses three related sets of data collected in Scotland, UK. First is the European 
Union (EU) ECO2 project, a multidisciplinary study into effects of sub-seabed CO2 storage on 
marine ecosystems. Twenty-three in-depth interviews were conducted in Scotland as part 
of comparative work on the social dimensions of CCS in Italy and the UK. Second is SiteChar, 
another EU project that characterises sites potentially suitable for CO2 storage. For the 
social characterisation phase, fourteen members of the public (reduced to eleven for 
weekend two) were recruited to attend two weekend-long ‘focus conferences’, hearing 
presentations, taking part in group discussion and writing their own positioning paper on 
the desirability or otherwise of CCS and how it should be implemented in Scotland. 
Transcripts of the group discussions, and the positioning paper itself, were analysed. Third 
is the QICS (Quantifying and Monitoring Potential Ecosystem Impacts of Geological Carbon 
Storage) project, part of which involved a controlled release of CO2 into sediments below a 
rural marine bay in west Scotland over a 37 day period, simulating the effect of leaking CO2 
on marine ecosystems. The authors of this paper attended a public meeting and ‘open day’ 
held at the experiment site, observed publics’ responses to the project presentation and 
carried out follow-up interviews with local community members. 
The target sample straddled what Shackley et al. (2007) term ‘tier 2’ (peripheral 
stakeholders such as environmental NGOs, local officials in areas with CCS potential) and 
‘tier 3’ (the general public). This focus on peripheral stakeholders and informed publics was 
because we sought to understand how overarching ethical and moral concepts informed 
people’s perceptions of CCS. Previous research shows that those within the CCS epistemic 
community are less open to critical reflection on the technology due to institutional and 
personal commitments (Stephens et al., 2011), whereas low awareness makes general 
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public opinions on CCS unstable and subject to frequent change (de Best-Waldhober et al., 
2009). Analysis of interview data and recorded discussion followed an adaptation of Doucet 
and Mauthner’s (2008) ‘Listening Guide’, reading the transcript four times: once for the 
analyst’s own responses; once for where the interviewee speaks about themselves; once for 
where the interviewee talks about relationships; and once for links to wider themes. This 
was done to try to avoid ‘cherry picking’ the most ‘exciting’ quotes by separating out the 
analyst’s own reactions from the themes the interviewees raised themselves. Written 
output and notes from ethnographic observation were then evaluated in light of the topics 
emerging from the voice-centered analysis. The strongest emerging themes were fairness in 
engagement processes; urgent action versus longer-term thinking; and envisioning a 
sustainable, low-carbon future. We now discuss how these build on Gough and Boucher’s 
(2013) faultlines of environmental justice, prevention of harm, and techno-scientific and 
regulatory competence. 
 
4. ETHICAL POSITIONS ON CCS: THEMES FROM EMPIRICAL DATA 
4.1 Justice in framing and solving the climate change problem 
Gough and Boucher (2013) explore intergenerational, social, environmental and financial 
justice in CCS, suggesting particular potential for an ethical faultline along environmental 
justice (which they define as justice for animals and ecosystems). We however focus on 
faultlines along slightly different conceptualisations of justice: epistemic, procedural and 
distributional. The Scottish data revealed a range of views on whether CCS could be seen as 
a just response to climate change. 
Distributional and procedural justice are well-rehearsed concepts in energy. Distributional 
justice refers to disparities in decision-making outcomes (Shrader-Frechette, 2002), 
whereas procedural justice is a concern about disparities in capability to participate 
effectively in decision-making processes (Rawls, 1973; McLaren, 2012). To the best of our 
knowledge, however, epistemic justice has not received such widespread attention in 
energy and climate change. Epistemic justice is a broader concern with justice in the way 
society interprets a significant phenomenon or tackles a complex question (Fricker, 2007). 
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Claims to epistemic injustice may arise if people feel they have been marginalised in the 
framing of a question because of their social identity, knowledge and access to accepted 
cognitive frameworks, or because they do not speak in the dominant language of decision-
making (Anderson, 2012). On first inspection, this may sound like procedural justice. Where 
we see difference is in the way epistemic justice goes beyond the processes of decision-
making alone to consider how the whole problem, and range of possible outcomes, are 
framed. Even if fair procedures are in place, claims to epistemic injustice may still arise if 
people feel marginalised in deciding what questions to ask in the first place, and in 
accessing the knowledge used to guide the field of questioning and possible outcomes.2 We 
see epistemic justice as particularly important for energy and climate change because the 
huge uncertainties involved – and potential for profound effects on peoples’ lives – mean 
governance based on ‘hard science’ alone may struggle to encompass the range of concerns 
at play. 
This notion of the range of potential solutions – and the kind of questions that can be asked 
– being pre-determined from on high arose in the SiteChar project. Whilst the proposals 
shown to the participants were indeed hypothetical, they contained considerable 
infrastructural and geological detail, and were presented by project developers and 
governments as being underway or imminent. This led some participants to question the 
value of their involvement: 
 
Eva: For me it’s a genuine question, how likely is our report to make any tangible 
difference? 
Sharon: At this stage especially. I was quite surprised when [the civil servant 
presenting] said it was, they’ve already been developing this policy for three years, 
so I’m thinking there’s this policy happening now, three years down the line, so I’m 
also concerned, sort of wondering, curious to know how much difference it will 
actually make. (Eva and Sharon,3 SiteChar weekend 2, April 2012). 
                                                 
2 See Mabon et al. (forthcoming) for a fuller discussion of epistemic justice in energy. 
3 All participant names referred to in this paper are pseudonyms. 
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And in several cases, feelings turned from curiosity and enthusiasm to despair or outright 
rage: 
 
One of the very first things you says to us was this was all hypothetical, about the 
storage site that’s out there, and you, we had hypothetical, that’s what you said, it’s 
all hypothetical. But where in theory the more we’ve came and done this and got 
more information from you, it’s more than likely that out there will be a storage site 
out there considering that it seems to be quite far down the line of going ahead for it. 
(Billy, SiteChar weekend 2, April 2012). 
 
Claims to epistemic injustice could arise from the way the engagement process is part of a 
bigger narrative in which the assumed end-point is CCS deployment – an end-point that 
people like Billy, Eva and Sharon feel they cannot influence. The publics taking part in this 
CCS ‘consultation’ have little sway over how the ‘problem’ of climate change is conceived 
and how the range of possible ‘solutions’ is framed. By the time publics are brought into 
engagement processes for CCS and other low-carbon technologies like it, many of the big 
decisions appear to have already been taken. A power station may have been chosen, rough 
pipeline routes determined and a site earmarked for geological storage. Billy’s concern that 
he had no opportunity to influence this framing of the whole problem seems to chime with 
the epistemic justice concerns of Fricker and Anderson. In Eva and Sharon’s discussion, 
there may be claims to both procedural and epistemic justice – procedural in that 
engagement is too late and too narrowly defined to give participants capability in decision-
making, and epistemic in that some actors feel excluded from the process of defining CCS as 
a fitting solution to climate change. 
It is important to note that not everyone participating in the citizens’ conference felt so 
despondent. Many respondents, particularly in north-east Scotland, were satisfied that 
appropriate procedures were in place to deal with issues that could arise from CCS 
deployment. When asked about other activities in the North Sea, a representative of the 
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Scottish fishing community described the network of oil and gas companies likely to be 
responsible for offshore CO2 storage thus: 
 
[Fishers] have worked with them from the start, and there’s very little conflict there 
now, there’s a process where people are advised as to what’s going on, there’s a 
recognition of loss or damage to gear, that if that’s easily proven then people are 
compensated for that immediately. (Callum, ECO2 interview, October 2012) 
 
The long relationship of cooperation between oil and gas companies and fishing 
communities is discussed very positively – the presence of a process for dialogue, lack of 
conflict and speed of compensation all suggest potential for claims to procedural injustice to 
arise is minimised. Contrast this to concerns over the proliferation of both on- and offshore 
wind development in the north-east, raised by a local councillor and retired fisher 
respectively when discussing energy: 
 
Very controversial one particularly in Aberdeenshire is wind power, we had the, the 
concern we’ve had more applications for wind turbines in Aberdeenshire as a 
councilled area than all the other local authority areas across Scotland put together, 
and that’s, it’s a heated debate. (Peter, ECO2 interview, October 2012) 
 
There is a societal and political imperative for development of renewable energy, we 
accept it, but it’s got to be, got to be remembered that we are an industry that has 
been operating in the marine environment for as long as human beings have been 
here and it doesn’t quite chime that fishermen are getting pushed out of the way for 
new ideas where, with a bit of planning and cooperation both could co-exist. (Jimmy, 
ECO2 interview, October 2012) 
 
Both respondents acknowledged the reality of climate change and the need to renew energy 
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systems during their interviews, but were anxious about the rapid deployment of wind 
energy in their area. The implication from the councillor’s comment seems to be that the 
area he represents is somehow being ‘used’ to provide renewable energy for the rest of 
Scotland, taking more than its fair share of new infrastructure. The concern about fisheries 
getting ‘pushed out of the way’ suggests potential for claims to procedural injustice, in that 
the respondent feels it is the lack of procedures for planning and cooperation that give rise 
to the potential for conflict rather than the mere presence of renewable energy 
infrastructure in the sea. 
Even for renewable sources that seem more inherently ‘good’ than fossil fuels, there is thus 
still potential for claims to distributional, procedural or epistemic injustice to arise – even 
among people who acknowledge the need to decarbonise. Likewise, the data suggests that 
more ethically contentious outcomes like CCS can return economic and infrastructural 
benefits to host communities,4 and implement sound procedures to allow different 
stakeholders to co-exist. A possible avenue of enquiry for future research may be to see 
whether perceptions of procedural or epistemic fairness can translate into outright support 
for a technological option that at first glance seems less ethically clear-cut, and whether this 
could help facilitate rapid mitigation deployment. 
 
4.2 Preventing harm: urgent action versus a more considered response? 
Gough and Boucher identify a second ethical faultline over preventing harm. That is, taking 
into account the possibility of future leakage, does CCS on balance put society at a lesser or 
greater risk of negative effects than other courses of action? Underneath this, we believe 
there is an even deeper faultline along the question of whether deploying CCS now is 
necessary to stave off the most dangerous effects of climate change, or whether focusing on 
a short to medium-term technological fix could ultimately put society at an even greater 
risk of harm, by both delaying the transition away from a fossil fuel economy and 
introducing psychological implications. 
                                                 
4 Alistair, another interviewed councillor, did however point out that the economic benefits of oil 
and gas have not been felt evenly throughout north-east Scotland. 
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Gardiner (2006) argues not only that failure to act now increases the level of mitigation or 
adaptation required in future5 but also that inaction by current generations may reinforce a 
carbon intensive infrastructure and limit the potential of future generations to act. CCS is 
challenging in this regard. If one believes its proponents, CCS is relatively close to technical 
readiness for full-scale deployment and can deliver significant emission reductions in a 
relatively short time frame – thus reducing the burden on future generations to take action. 
Bioenergy CCS may (if developed) arguably reduce existing atmospheric CO2 
concentrations, extracting energy from biomass combustion while capturing and storing 
CO2 fixed in plant matter by the conversion of atmospheric CO2 during photosynthesis. Yet 
as Markusson et al. (2012) explain, climate change mitigation from conventional CCS could 
lead to society being ‘locked in’ to ongoing use of fossil fuels, reinforcing a carbon intensive 
infrastructure and limiting capacity of future generations to act outside of this 
infrastructure. Hammond et al (2013) even suggest that CCS is likely to deliver only a 
seventy per cent reduction in full-cycle CO2 emissions under credible energy system 
scenarios. 
This perpetuation of a fossil fuel energy system and economy was troubling for some. There 
was a sense that investment in the research and development of CCS technologies merely 
delayed the inevitable need to move away from a fossil fuel-based society, at worst 
diverting funding away from development of renewable energy. As a researcher with a 
policy background working closely with the QICS experiment explained when asked about 
his views on CCS more broadly: 
 
[CCS is] something that society might well have to do but it’s a temporary fix while 
we try to turn the supertanker around … Until we can wean ourselves off heavy use 
of fossil fuels then we’re going to have to do some clever fixes. It’s a sad situation 
really, because we’ve known about the effects of fossil fuels, climate change, for quite 
a long time and slightly more recently things like ocean acidification, and the 
response time is incredibly slow, and in fact what we’re looking now at are all sorts 
                                                 
5 We would suggest that ‘acting now’ may also include investing in research and development in 
the present so that solutions deployed in future may be cheaper and technically superior. 
13 
 
of schemes to accelerate the production of fossil fuels rather than sensible means of 
reducing it. (Brendan, ECO2/QICS follow-up interview, October 2012) 
 
Brendan does not oppose CCS outright, acknowledging its pragmatic value in buying time 
for larger systemic changes. Rather, the ethical concern is the potential for 
misappropriation of CCS, that the technology will be used to allow society to continue 
indefinitely on its current trajectory – perhaps even speeding up fossil fuel use – instead of 
facilitating more gradual technological and structural changes. The argument that 
knowledge about the negative effects of fossil fuels has existed for a long time is used to 
further emphasise how the uncritical adoption of technologies like CCS that continue fossil 
fuel use could be seen as morally irresponsible behaviour. 
Another implication of Brendan’s account is that, given society’s less than impressive track 
record to date in being able to change course in response to climate change, there is little to 
suggest it should be any better from now on. Under this rationale, it may make sense to 
develop ways of limiting anthropogenic CO2 emissions within existing infrastructure, 
particularly if the alternative is runaway climate change from continuing unabated fossil 
fuel use. This is the view encapsulated by environmental impact assessor Scott, who 
rationalises the need for CCS thus: 
 
I think there is an end goal, particularly in Scotland and the western world of trying 
to move to renewables, but that’s not going to happen any time soon, so to reduce 
the potential effects of global warming we need a sticking plaster or bridge to enable 
us to reach that destination, and to be able to do that in my opinion, in the relatively 
short term CCS is the only opportunity because we have the infrastructure and 
capability, technology and some of the knowledge to be able to do that. (Scott, ECO2 
interview, April 2012) 
 
Scott’s position is that the speed of development of renewable energy infrastructure is too 
slow to be able to mitigate the most dangerous effects of climate change. The use of words 
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like ‘infrastructure’ and ‘technology’ suggests that the kind of outcome Scott is aiming for is 
one where present social arrangements continue as much as possible, the ethical concern 
being that failing to deploy CCS would put society at greater risk of exposure to negative 
effects from either climate change or an inadequate and prematurely-deployed renewables 
network. Whilst facilitating a smooth transition to a renewed energy network within 
existing social structures was for some a suitable trajectory, others wondered about the 
future implications of CCS (and technology more generally) diverting attention away from 
the cumulative effects on humans’ collective well-being: 
 
How much damage are we doing to ourselves by internalising the knowledge that we 
are hiding CO2 out of view? In the same way that buried personal emotional issues 
tend to resurface with upset (until acknowledged, processed and resolved); so 
burying rather than dealing with the cause of excessive CO2 may be damaging to our 
collective psychological wellbeing. 
 
This extract, from the positioning paper the Moray citizens produced on CCS (in Brunsting 
et al., 2012) implies that fitting extra technology onto existing fossil fuel power systems to 
capture the emissions, and subsequently injecting these emissions into the ground, could be 
seen as an acknowledgement of the failure of economically developed societies to curb their 
carbon dioxide emissions in the first instance. The concern is that this could leave a 
psychological legacy for current and future generations, passing on a risk of psychological 
malaise to future members of society as a result of failure to imagine more sustainable ways 
of living. 
 
4.3 Are we competent enough to do CCS? Do we even need competence in CCS? 
The third ethical dimension we consider relates to how CCS fits into differing visions of an 
appropriate low-carbon future. Gough and Boucher (2013) identify two separate faultlines 
along techno-scientific competence and managerial and regulatory competence, albeit both 
focused on whether there is sufficient knowledge for the effective, safe and reliable 
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operation of CCS (and what happens if there is not). For our purposes we take this notion of 
‘competence’ as one entity, as many participants in our study questioned whether society 
even needs competence in CCS in the first place. What we are getting at here is that there 
are multiple visions of what a sustainable low-carbon future might look like and what 
society needs to do to get there, with CCS fitting well into some but certainly not into all of 
these. Indeed, Gough and Boucher suggest further enquiry is needed into how CCS relates to 
human values and ideas of ‘appropriate’ progress for society. 
The tightly-bounded rationale for CCS when it is communicated to publics, stakeholders and 
opinion-formers is challenging. As outlined in Section 1, this is often a linear narrative of 
CCS as the only way to reduce CO2 emissions in the time-frame available, due to the relative 
immaturity of renewables and the requirement for a baseload energy source (GCCSI, 2014; 
IEAGHG, 2014). Typically, the narrative then goes on to dispel a range of ‘myths’, ensuring 
people are aware that CO2 cannot explode, that stored CO2 is very unlikely to leak, that the 
risk to human health is virtually non-existent. Proponents of CCS often argue that, if publics 
can come to ‘accept’ this rationale via good communication, then support for deployment 
can be garnered (CSIRO, 2010). 
Wynne (2006) is critical of over-emphasis on communication in science, arguing that this 
misses the point that publics may evaluate technologies in terms of values, morals and 
ethics. Douglas (1992) likewise suggests that what people actually weigh up are contesting 
notions of the ‘good life’ rather than the minutiae of risk assessment. Indeed, in our study 
CCS was often evaluated not in terms of potential to reduce emissions, but rather how it 
connected with the wider values and principles of a sustainable future society. Proving that 
CCS is safe and viable may thus do little to engender support among people whose vision of 
the future lies outwith the parameters of the CCS rationale – such people may see no need 
for competence in CCS. For instance, technology like CCS that keeps society on a trajectory 
of reliance on large-scale infrastructure was perceived by some as a missed opportunity for 
more profound societal change. As a farmer in Argyll reflected when moving from CCS to 
discuss the role of energy in society more widely: 
 
Meat, we produce huge amounts of it, but it goes elsewhere, we don’t eat it, 
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somebody else down south eats it … Energy’s the same, you know, why are we not 
doing little domestic things, how do they really work, why don’t they, you know? We 
keep looking and wind, wind and solar and what have you, yes there’s the big stuff, 
but so many other countries they do little, tiny setups, but every time you talk to 
anyone, oh they don’t work, well why would people, other people keep using them if 
they didn’t work? (Gail, ECO2/QICS follow-up interview, October 2012) 
 
For Gail, what comes to the fore is not climate change mitigation but the longer-term 
sustainability of a rural community, which large-scale technological solutions conceived 
within existing governance structures alone are unlikely to attain. Gail presents the 
challenge of reflecting on the inefficiency of processes embedded in current social 
organisation, here food logistics and centralised energy networks, and using this 
opportunity to imagine more sustainable ways of doing things. It is not techno-scientific 
competence that is required to reach the kind of future society Gail envisions, but 
competence in imagining new ways of living and governing. There are here clear parallels 
to Weston’s (2009) challenge to imagine possibilities for different kinds of social 
organisation that may lie outwith the constraints of existing social structures.  
Even accounts that were more focused on the nearer-term effects of climate change 
reflected on the kind of society that would be produced as a result of mitigation or 
adaptation measures. When asked how decision-making processes could be improved, a 
conservation officer for a major British NGO raised the possibility of wildlife or ecosystems 
suffering negative effects from humans’ narrow attempts to control CO2 levels by deploying 
widespread low-carbon energy: 
 
Marine renewables again, you know, very welcome as a response to the problem of 
climate change, but … this can obviously have a nature conservation impact, but 
those impacts are not very well characterised because it’s an emerging industry, 
which I guess would be the same thing with carbon capture under the seabed. 
(Simon, ECO2 interview, July 2011) 
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This links to the possible psychological effects of the geological storage of carbon dioxide 
raised in Section 4.2. Whilst CCS may be an effective way to keep CO2 levels in check, 
concern was expressed by some that focusing too narrowly on meeting targets may lead to 
side-effects that could reduce quality of life in other ways. Loss of biodiversity is presented 
here as exactly one such potential side-effect, illustrating how, for many stakeholders and 
informed publics, CO2 emission reduction was just one factor among many to be considered 
as part of their imagination of a sustainable, low-carbon future. CCS may thus not be viewed 
as a proper or appropriate technology if it is perceived to have potential disruptive effects 
on the wider natural environment. 
A final question is whether CO2 storage/disposal could even be seen as not making full use 
of society’s competences in technological innovation. Some participants suggested CO2 was 
a potentially valuable resource that ought not to be thrown away. In the SiteChar citizens’ 
conference, one participant in particular took a keen interest in alternative uses for carbon 
dioxide as opposed to mere storage (in Brunsting et al., 2012) and a technical consultant 
interviewed for the ECO2 project objected right from the start to the very basic principle of 
CCS: 
 
I actually think it’s a waste of a resource, but that’s because I’m technically aware 
that it’s possible to do something with that carbon rather than inject it into the 
ground, there are possibly preferable technical options. So I, I very much view it 
from a technical point of view, but it seems to me to be a very, very, very expensive 
way of trying to continue to do an old-fashioned system. (Murray, ECO2 interview, 
October 2012) 
 
The idea of ‘storage’ as wasteful, and ‘innovation’ as a more appropriate trajectory, came 
across in a number of interactions. As can be seen through language like ‘waste of a 
resource’ and ‘old-fashioned system’, there is an associated sense in which CO2 storage is 
somehow a lazy or less intrinsically good use of the captured material. In this regard, 
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competence in CO2 capture is seen as part of the future, but there is also a view that society 
could do better than merely storing CO2. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
A range of ethical and value positions emerged around CCS in Scotland, largely reflecting 
the faultlines of justice, prevention of harm and techno-social competence identified by 
Gough and Boucher (2013). In fact, the faultlines in the Scottish study ran even deeper to 
encompass how CCS did or did not fit into different visions of a low-carbon future. Publics 
and stakeholders to varying extents enacted Preston’s (2011) critique of the moral 
presumption against geoengineering. A number of people in our sample did conceptualise 
CCS as a ‘lesser evil’. This included not only those who might gain financially from ongoing 
fossil fuel use, but also others (councillors, fishers) who felt good relationships with oil and 
gas developers engendered trust in implementing bodies and reduced potential for conflict, 
and NGOs who accepted the need for a short-term baseload energy supply and viewed 
’clean’ coal and gas as preferable to nuclear power. Others cautiously acknowledged the 
embeddedness of fossil fuels in society and the pragmatic need to reduce emissions, but 
were concerned that CCS deployment could become an end in itself rather than a bridge to a 
non-fossil fuel future. This group included academics interested in historical processes of 
change and entrepreneurs viewing fossil fuels as finite. A third group perhaps saw CCS as 
the ‘greater evil’ – people with more environmentalist and/or egalitarian leanings who felt 
an imperative to imagine more harmonious relationships with nature outside of 
technological ‘fixes’ and meeting targets, and a minority who viewed CO2 storage as 
somehow a failure of humans to think innovatively and put captured CO2 to good use. 
A breadth of positions also emerged along Preston’s (2011) second argument: prioritising 
human well-being. Many who felt CCS did prioritise well-being believed the transition to 
renewables is happening too slowly, hence several decades of controlled fossil fuel energy 
are needed to reduce risks to society from unabated climate change or volatile energy 
prices and supplies. In north-east Scotland at least, CCS could also be perceived as having 
low potential for claims of injustice, given the long and largely positive relationship with the 
hydrocarbon industry that will be responsible for CO2 storage. However, another coalition 
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warned against overstating the positive benefits of fossil fuels in Scotland, citing 
distributional injustices and exclusion from the bigger project of framing the climate change 
problem and its potential field of solutions. A third group, with strong environmentalist 
leanings and/or knowledge of the scientific uncertainties of CCS, objected to imposing 
financial, techno-scientific and psychological risks on future generations. 
In this small-scale study, publics and stakeholders acknowledging the severity of climate 
change and the need for deep and urgent cuts in anthropogenic CO2 emissions were often 
prepared to entertain the possibility of a solution that might seem less inherently ‘good’ 
than renewable energy. Actors with seemingly different world views had potential to 
coalesce around the idea of CCS as the next stopping point on the road to decarbonisation, 
even if their ultimate visions of a low-carbon future were very different. This suggests that 
ideas such as ‘lesser evil’ and the prioritisation of human well-being do inform decision-
making around climate change mitigation. However, we caution that others felt excluded 
from the process of defining the ‘problem’ of climate change and the field of potential 
‘solutions’. Our sample also included nobody openly sceptical of anthropogenic climate 
change, so the question remains of how someone who did not buy in to the tightly-bounded 
rationale for CCS from the outset might engage with the technology. 
We finish with two overarching observations. One concerns not underestimating the ability 
of members of society to tackle spatially, temporally and ethically complex issues. Carr et al. 
(2013) argue that publics are capable of engaging in complex social and ethical discussions 
on solar radiation management, even with minimal technical knowledge. Many respondents 
in the ECO2 project spoke not of the ability of CCS to reduce emissions or ensure public 
safety, but of what they thought a fitting and appropriate vision of the future looked like. 
The discussion of the SiteChar participants on potential psychological impacts of ‘hiding’ 
CO2 underground also demonstrates how public conceptions of social well-being under 
conditions of climate change can extend far beyond discussing 450 parts per million CO2 in 
the atmosphere or 2°C warming. 
Second is the need for broad-based rationales when addressing climate change. The case of 
CCS – where, for many long-term issues like CO2 migration and induced seismicity, 
scientists are unable to provide unequivocal answers – exemplifies very well the centrality 
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of values to interpretations of the science underpinning environmental change. 
Communication of risks and probabilities alone may not be effective for those who do not 
engage with this scientific rationale, or whose world view leads them to evaluate 
uncertainties differently. In cases like this, the most fruitful course of action may be to allow 
open discussion over what leads different people to understand environmental science and 
technology differently, but all the time keeping a check on finding pathways which head in 
the common direction of mitigating environmental change. 
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